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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. BARKER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
and Respondents on 
the Cross Appeal 
v. 
DR. HOWARD R. FRANCIS, 
DEANNE TANNER FRANCIS, 
DR. LARRY FRANCIS, and 
ANN BANKS FRANCIS, 
Defendants-Respondents 
and Cross Appellants. 
Case No. 20870 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Court can remake the contract for the 
parties and enforce a different agreement than that signed. 
2. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to specific 
performance because of the inequitable conduct of Plaintiff and 
his agent. 
3. Whether the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase is enforceable since it is indefinite. 
4. Whether the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase is enforceable since there was not a timely closing. 
5. Whether the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase is enforceable since Plaintiff failed to tender 
performance under the agreement. 
6. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought suit for the specific performance of 
an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase wherein 
Plaintiff agreed to exchange 80 acres of farm land with 180 
shares of Scofield Reservoir water for a ranch owned by 
Defendants in Nine Mile Canyon. At a trial without a jury, the 
court found that the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase was enforceable. However, the court also found that 
the earnest money agreement could not be specifically enforced 
since the wives of the Defendants, who had an ownership 
interest in the ranch, had not signed the earnest money 
agreement and had not agreed to the property exchange. The 
court found that Defendants Howard and Larry Francis did breach 
the earnest money agreement. However, the court found that the 
Plaintiff failed to introduce any competent evidence on 
damages. The court therefore awarded Plaintiff nominal damages 
of $1.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of $22,126.80. 
Plaintiff brought this appeal seeking reversal of the judgment 
against Plaintiff on specific performance, and Defendants have 
cross appealed from the judgment in favor of Plaintiff for 
nominal damages and attorneys fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Robert Barker owns a farm near Wellington, 
Utah. (Tr. 152) Roger Olson, a real estate broker, approached 
Mr. Barker to obtain a listing on some property Mr. Barker 
owned. (Tr. 61) At that time Mr. Barker informed Mr. Olson 
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that he was looking to buy a ranch, (Tr. 61.) Mr. Olson 
informed Mr. Barker that he was aware of a ranch for sale in 
the area and that he would investigate it and get back to him. 
(Tr. 61.) 
Defendant Larry Francis is a doctor specializing in 
obstetrics and gynecology. (Tr. 17) His brother, Larry 
Francis, is a dentist. (Tr. 359) Larry and Howard Francis 
along with their wives own a ranch in Nine Mile Canyon, located 
in Carbon County and Duchesne County, Utah. Mr. Olson was a 
patient of Larry Francis. (Tr. 362) In about January of 1980, 
Mr. Olson went to see Larry Francis and asked him if he was 
willing to sell the Nine Mile Ranch. (Tr. 363) Larry Francis 
told him that he would be if they could get $600,000 for it. 
(Tr. 363) Jerry S. Sprouse had an option to purchase the ranch 
for $595,000. (Tr. 27) Larry Francis refused to give Mr. 
Olson a listing agreement, but he gave him verbal permission to 
show the ranch. (Tr. 63) Howard and Larry Francis were 
interested in selling the ranch in order to get some cash 
flow. (Tr. 325) 
Mr. Olson then showed Mr. Barker the ranch. (Tr. 64) 
Mr. Barker did not see the Larry and Howard at the time. (Tr. 
159) After viewing the ranch, Mr. Olson and Mr. Barker 
returned to Mr. Barker's home where they filled out the Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase which is the subject of 
this suit. (Tr. 159) 
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Mr. Barker offered to purchase the "Howard Francis and 
Larry Francis Ranch in Nine Mile Canyon." The total purchase 
price was $600,000 which was to be paid $1,000 cash; "the 
balance of $599,000 shall be paid as follows: Buyer agrees to 
trade and seller agrees to accept in trade as payment for the 
balance 173 shares of Scofield Resevoir (sic) water and 80 
acres near Wellington, Utah belonging to the buyer." (Ex. 1) 
A closing date of April 1, 1980 was proposed. (Ex. 1) 
Mr. Olson then took the earnest money agreement to 
Larry and Howard Francis. Larry and Howard were told by Mr. 
Olson that the 80 acres owned by Mr. Barker was an irrigated 
functional farm. (Tr. 325) The Scofield water shares were 
represented to be worth $2,800 per share. (Tr. 82, 186, 365, 
371) Larry and Howard had not seen the Barker farm before 
signing the earnest money agreement. (Tr. 34) 
All the representations regarding the farm to Larry 
and Howard came from Mr. Olson who had received the information 
from Mr. Barker. (Tr. 30) Based on the representations of Mr. 
Olson, the Barker property exchange seemed to be an attractive 
agreement to Larry and Howard. (Tr. 30) 
Larry and Howard still had questions and thought they 
needed to investigate matters before signing the earnest money 
agreement, and they needed to discuss the matter with their 
wives. (Tr. 324, 325) Howard Francis told Mr. Olson that he 
did not want to sign the agreement. (Tr. 318) Mr. Olson 
replied that he would have to take somethimg back to Mr. Barker 
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in writing so the parties would not get lost negotiating back 
and forth. (Tr. 318) Both Larry and Howard agreed to sign the 
agreement based on the understanding that the earnest money 
receipt was a work sheet only and not a valid binding 
agreement. (Tr. 319, 328, 380) Mr. Olson replied that he also 
understood and realized that the earnest money was not 
sufficient. (Tr. 319) 
Deanne Francis, the wife of Howard Francis, was also a 
joint owner in the Nine Mile Ranch. She had not been involved 
in the negotiations for the sale. (Tr. 295) Mr. Olson came to 
Mrs. Francis1 home and explained why he was there. Deanne 
Francis told him that she did not want to sign the agreement. 
(Tr. 297) Mr. Olson replied that it wasn't a binding 
agreement, that it was just a preliminary paper. (Tr. 297, 
298) 
Additionally, Anne Francis, the wife of Larry Francis, 
who also has a joint interest in the Nine Mile Ranch, was not 
involved in the negotiations for the property exchange. (Tr. 
350) Mr. Olson also represented to her when he was at the home 
to obtain Larry Francis1 signature that the earnest money 
agreement was just a preliminary paper to tell Mr. Barker that 
they were interested in his property. (Tr. 350) 
Howard and Larry Francis and Robert Barker made 
several proposals and counter proposals on the earnest money 
receipt. Included in the different proposals, the shares of 
water stock were increased to 180 shares. Additionally, Larry 
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and Howard were to reserve 40 acres of summer range out of the 
Nine Mile ranch. (Ex. 1) On April 21, 1980, Howard and Larry 
Francis signed the agreement with the phrase, "Agree to 
above." A closing date of May 1, 1980 was specified in the 
earnest money receipt. (Ex. 1) Mr. Olson represented from the 
beginning to the time the earnest money agreement was signed 
that it was a work sheet only. (Tr. 328, 329) 
When Larry and Howard finally signed the agreement 
they did not understand that it was a final agreement. (Tr. 
319, 380) If they had understood that it was a binding 
agreement, they would not have signed it. (Tr. 323) 
Neither Deanne Francis nor Anne Francis signed the 
earnest money agreement. (Ex. 1) Deanne Francis had not 
consented to having her husband sign the agreement on her 
behalf. (Tr. 296) She never agreed to the property exchange 
and she would not have signed the agreement if her husband had 
brought the document to her to sign. (Tr. 308) In addition, 
Anne Francis did not advise her husband that he could act for 
her in connection with negotiations about selling the Nine Mile 
Ranch. (Tr. 350) She also was not in favor of the property 
exchange. (Tr. 351) 
The Saturday following April 21, 1980, the date the 
agreement was signed by the doctors, was the first time Howard 
Francis went to the Barker farm. (Tr. 34) Howard Francis 
later made another visit to the farm. (Tr. 39) The doctors 
-6-
made some inquiries as to the value of the water stock. (Tr. 
35) Based on the investigations made, Larry and Howard Francis 
eventually told Mr. Olson not to go ahead with the deal. (Tr. 
36) 
The earnest money agreement provided that Mr. Barker 
would convey 80 acres. (Ex. 1) However, Mr. Barker's farm had 
approximately 150 acres. (Tr. 150) Mr. Barker never gave Mr. 
Olson a legal description to the 80 acres. (Tr. 90) 
Of the 80 acres of property Mr. Barker intended to 
convey, approximately 25 or more acres lie on the east side of 
the road. (Tr. 145) There is a deep gulley running down a 
portion of the property. (Tr. 145) Of the total 80 acres, 
there are only 30 acres of irrigated crops and 18 acres of 
irrigated pasture. (Tr. 145, 146) There are 32 acres of brush 
and waste land that produce nothing. (Tr. 146) 
The parties continued to negotiate for a period of 
time. However, the parties never reached a final agreement. 
Mr. Barker brought suit seeking specific performance of the 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase or in the 
alternative damages. The case was tried before the Honorable 
Boyd Bunnell on March 7 and 8, 1985. The trial court found 
that the earnest money agreement was legaly enforceable. 
However, the court found that since Deanne Francis and Anne 
Francis each owned an undivided one-fourth interest in the Nine 
Mile ranch and because they did not sign the earnest money 
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agreement nor authorize their husbands to act as their agents, 
the court could not order specific performance. (R. 173-177) 
The court did find that Howard Francis and Larry 
Francis breached the earnest money agreement. However, the 
court found that Plaintiff had failed to present competent 
evidence of damages. Therefore, the court awarded Plaintiff 
$1.00 nominal damages and $22,126.80 attorneys fees. (R. 229) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance as 
he argues on appeal. The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase entered into by Plaintiff and Defendants Larry and 
Howard Francis provides for an exchange of property. 
Defendants Howard and Larry Francis did not agree to pay 
Plaintiff $600,000 for Plaintiff's farm and water stock. 
Howard and Larry Francis were interested in selling their ranch 
in order to obtain cash flow. They did not want to obtain 
additional property. The relief that Plaintiff seeks on appeal 
would require this Court to rewrite the contract for the 
parties and enforce an agreement which the parties did not 
enter into. A court of equity does not have the authority to 
rewrite the contract of the parties. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance 
because of his own inequitable conduct and the inequitable 
conduct of his agent. The real estate agent handling the 
transaction represented to the Defendants that the earnest 
money agreement was only a work sheet and a preliminary 
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agreement and not a final binding contract. On this basis the 
Defendants Larry Francis and Howard Francis signed the earnest 
money agreement without having first seen the farm property or 
investigated the water stock* They anticipated that they could 
still investigate the property and determine the value of the 
stock. Additionally, Plaintiff agreed to convey 80 acres of 
farm. However, a large portion of the ground was unusable 
brush and waste land. 
The earnest money agreement is not enforceable because 
it is indefinite and there was no meeting of the minds of the 
parties. Plaintiff agreed to convey an undefined 80 acres of 
property, yet he owned 150 acres in the area. Plaintiff never 
provided a legal description of the property. Defendants were 
never told which 80 acres of the 150 acres they were to 
receive. Additionally, the parties had not decided on a number 
of other material matters. The Defendants understood that the 
agreement was a work sheet only and not a final agreement. 
Therefore the contract is not enforceable. 
The contract could not be enforced since it was not 
timely closed, and there was not a tender of performance by 
Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on the issue 
of damages because he elected specific performance as a remedy 
and the new trial is barred by res judicata. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys fees since the 
contract is unenforceable and Plaintiff elected specific 
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performance and was therefore not entitled to nominal damages 
and attorneys fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY 
TO MAKE A NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PARTIES AS 
PROPOSED BY PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff, for the first time on appeal, asks this 
Court for an order directing that Defendants Howard and Larry 
Francis pay Plaintiff Robert Barker $600,000 in exchange for 
his conveyance to them of 180 shares of Scofield Reservoir 
water and 80 acres of land near Wellington, Utah. However, 
this is not the agreement that the parties entered into and 
such an order would constitute the remaking of an agreement for 
the parties. This would be contrary to law and principles of 
equity. 
Courts are required to construe the contract made by 
the parties rather than to make a contract for the parties. 
East Mill Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159 
P.2d 863, 867 (1945). Courts will not enforce asserted rights 
that are not supported by the contract itself. Rio Algom 
Corporation v. Jimco LTD., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). 
Specific performance connotes performance specifically 
as agreed. Haire v. Patterson, 63 Wash 2d 282, 386 P.2d 953, 
956 (1963). It is not for a court to rewrite a contract or to 
change the bargain on the basis of supposed equitable 
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principles. Dalton v. Jerico Construction Co., 642 P.2d 748, 
750 (Utah 1982). In Usinger v. Campbell, 280 Or. 751, 572 P.2d 
1018, 1021 (1977), an action for specific performance of an 
earnest money agreement, the court stated that in seeking 
specific performance, plaintiffs must rely on the terms of the 
earnest money agreement. "Although the powers of an equity 
court are broad, they do not permit the court to rewrite the 
contract for the parties." JEc[. In D. H. Overmyer v. Brown, 
439 F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1971), the Tenth Circuit in 
construing Utah law stated: 
Equity cannot make a new contract for the 
parties, but must enforce the contract according to 
its terms or not at all; the court will not make a 
contract for the parties or supply any material 
stipulation thereof. If a decree of specific 
performance should be entered in such a case, it would 
be uncertain whether the court was enforcing the 
contract the parties had agreed upon, or whether it 
was making a new agreement for them, and decreeing its 
execution. 
It is one thing to interpret a contract or discern the 
contractual intent of the parties pursuant to established legal 
rules, but it is another thing to make a contract for the 
parties. Courts are obligated to do the former and are 
prohibited from doing the latter. McCartney v. Malm, 627 P.2d 
1014, 1020 (Wyo. 1981). 
The court will not make a contract for the 
parties. The contract made by them must, generally, 
be enforced, if enforced at all, according to its 
terms . . . In rendering a decree of specific 
performance, the court has no power to decree 
performance in any other manner than according to the 
agreement of the parties. The court should not assume 
to make a new contract for the parties and then decree 
its specific performance, or undertake to compel the 
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defendant to do something he did not contract or agree 
to do, but should enforce the contract in question 
according to its terms or not at all. 
Otis Oil and Gas Corporation v. Maier, 74 Wyo. 137, 284 P.2d 
653, 656 (1955). 
The Earnest Money and Offer to Purchase signed by the 
parties in this case provides as follows: 
I, Robert Barker hereby deposit with you as 
earnest money the sum of $1,000 One Thousand Dollars 
to secure and apply on the purchase of the property at 
Howard Francis and Larry Francis Ranch in Nine Mile 
Canyon . . . . 
The total purchase price of $600,000 Dollars 
shall be payable as follows: $1,000 which represents 
the aforedescribed deposit . . . cash out by trade. 
. . . The balance of $599,000.00 shall be paid as 
follows: Buyer agrees to trade and seller agrees to 
accept in trade as payment for the balance 173 shares 
of Scofield Reservoir water and 80 acres near 
Wellington, Utah, belonging to the buyer. 
On the counter proposal on the earnest money, the language was 
changed to 180 shares of Scofield Reservoir water. (Ex. 1) 
If this is construed to be a binding agreement, it is 
an agreement to exchange property. Larry and Howard Francis 
were to trade their ranch in Nine Mile Canyon for Robert 
Barker's 180 shares of Scofield Reservoir water and 80 acres of 
land near Wellington, Utah. Larry and Howard Francis have at 
no time agreed to pay $600,000 to Robert Barker for his water 
shares and 80 acres. 
Larry and Howard Francis were desirous of selling 
their ranch in order to obtain some needed cash flow. (Tr. 
325, testimony of Howard Francis) They thought they could get 
this cash flow by selling the water stock. They did not want 
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to obtain additional property and the water shares and have to 
give up $600,000 cash. They were looking to liquidate the 
property and obtain cash flow and not to obtain additional 
property. 
It would not be partial performance to require Howard 
and Larry Francis to pay $600,000 for Barker's property. It 
would be rewriting the contract and making a new contract on 
behalf of the parties. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF IS PRECLUDED FROM OBTAINING 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE BECAUSE OF HIS 
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
There are five prerequisites before a contract can be 
specifically performed. First, there must be a contract; 
second, the terms of the contract must be certain and fair; 
third, there must be an absence of inequitable conduct on the 
plaintiff's part; fourth, there must be an absence of hardship 
to the defendant or the public outweighing the benefit to the 
plaintiff from performance of the contract; and fifth, there 
must be no other adequate remedy at law. How v. Fulkerson, 22 
Ariz. App. 467, 528 P.2d 853, 855 (1975). Specific performance 
is a remedy of equity, and one who invokes it must have clean 
hands in having done equity himself. Fischer v. Johnson, 525 
P.2d 45, 46 (Utah 1974). 
In the instant case, Roger Olson represented to the 
Francises that the earnest money agreement was only a work 
sheet and not a valid, binding agreement. (Tr. 319, 328, 
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testimony of Howard Francis; Tr. 297, testimony of Deanrie 
Francis) On that basis only did Larry and Howard Francis sign 
the earnest money agreement. (Tr. 323, testimony of Howard 
Francis; Tr. 373, testimony of Larry Francis) 
The misrepresentation of the nature and character and 
the legal effect of a document has been held to be actionable 
fraud. See, Berkeley Bank for Coop v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 
(Utah 1980). Under the circumstance of this case where the 
Defendants Howard and Larry Francis only signed the earnest 
money agreement on the basis that they believed, as represented 
by Mr. Olson, that the document was not a binding agreement and 
only a work sheet, it would be inequitable for this Court to 
enforce such an agreement. 
Furthermore, Mr. Barker misrepresented the 80 acres he 
was trading. Howard and Larry were told that the 80 acres were 
an irrigated functional farm. (Tr. 325, testimony of Howard 
Francis) However, there is a large gulley in a portion of the 
property. (Tr. 145, testimony of Steven Hatch) Of the total 
80 acres, there are only 30 acres of irrigated crops and 18 
acres of irrigated pasture. (Tr. 145-146, testimony of Steven 
Hatch) There are 32 acres of brush and waste land that produce 
nothing. (JDd.) It would also be inequitable to enforce the 
agreement when Mr. Barker has misrepresented and omitted such 
material facts. 
Additionally, Defendants attempted to introduce 
evidence to show that the value of the Barker farm and the 
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shares in the Scofield Reservoir water were misrepresented. 
However, the Court precluded this evidence on the basis that 
the Defendants had failed to plead fraud in their answer with 
the requisite specificity. The Court denied Defendants' motion 
to amend the answer to allege fraud in more particularity and 
the Court waived the proffer of proof on the evidence of the 
issue of misrepresentation of the value of the stock and the 
land. (Tr. 207-208) The trial court erred in not allowing 
evidence as to the misrepresentation since the plaintiff must 
prove, as one of the requisite elements to obtain specific 
performance of a contract, that he acted equitably and in good 
faith. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES 
Plaintiff argues in the conclusion of his brief that 
in the event this Court determines that the trial court 
appropriately ruled against specific performance, then 
Plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages. Plaintiff further 
argues that this case should be remanded to the trial court for 
a new trial on the issue of damages. However, Plaintiff is 
barred from pursuing a damage claim under the doctrines of 
election of remedy and res judicata. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff in his Amended 
Complaint sought specific performance of the earnest money 
agreement, or in the alternative, damages for its alleged 
breach. In December 1984, Defendants made a motion to require 
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Plaintiff to make an election of remedies. Although 
Defendants1 motion was denied, the law is clear that Plaintiff 
was required to make an election. See, Midvale Motors v. 
Saunders, 19 Utah 2d 403, 432 P.2d 37 (1967). At trial, 
Plaintiff presented his case on the basis of seeking specific 
performance. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that when there are 
inconsistent suits in law and equity, the trial court ought to 
require the Plaintiff to make an election. In State v. Morse, 
36 Utah 362, 103 Pac. 969, 970 (1909), the court stated: 
If the petitioner is suing the defendant both at law 
and in equity at the same time and for the same 
matter, the defendant can require the petitioner to 
elect whether she will proceed with the suit in equity 
or with the action at law . . . If no such election 
was made, the court ought to require her to make an 
election . . . 
When the law gives several means for redress or relief 
predicated upon conflicting theories, the election of one of 
them operates as a bar against a subsequent adoption of 
others. Lindsay v. Keimig, 184 Kan. 89, 334 P.2d 326, 328 
(1959); Davidson v. McKown, 157 Kan. 217, 139 P.2d 421 (1943); 
Wilder v. Wilhite, 190 Kan. 564, 376 P.2d 797, 801 (1962). 
Consistently, the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
when there are open at the same time two coexisting remedies 
which are alternative and inconsistent with each other; and, 
when the plaintiff has elected one of the remedies, the other 
remedy is no longer available. Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor 
Co., 69 Utah 161, 253 Pac. 196, 199 (1927). 
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The purpose of the doctrine of election of remedies is 
to prevent double redress for a single wrong. Royal Resources 
v, Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979). A 
plaintiff who comes into court asserting or denying his rights 
cannot assume and occupy an inconsistent position. To this 
extent the doctrine of election of remedies is founded upon 
equitable principles of estoppel. Where a litigant having an 
election as to remedial rights which are inconsistent sees fit 
to adopt one, he excludes the other and is thereafter estopped 
to rely on it for either affirmative or defensive purposes. 
Davidson, supra at 426. 
In Ladd v. General Insurance Company, 236 Or. 260, 387 
P.2d 572 (1963) the court held that the doctrine of election of 
remedies has some similarities with the doctrine of res 
judicata. The court stated: 
Election of remedies ordinarily characterizes the 
situation in which a plaintiff who has two or more 
available avenues to the same general relief pursues 
one to judgment . . . He may thereafter be precluded 
from pursuing the others . . . When enforced, the 
rule forbids subsequent litigation, either to enhance 
a meager victory won in the first effort or to 
rehabilitate a defeat suffered there. (Emphasis added) 
!£. at 574-75. 
The Utah Supreme Court has outlined the factual 
situation where the election of remedy doctrine applies: 
The true rule seems to be (1) that there must be, in 
fact, two or more coexisting remedies upon which the 
party has the right to elect; (2) the remedies thus 
open to him must be alternative and inconsistent; and 
(3) he must by actually bringing an action or by some 
other decisive act, with knowledge of the facts, 
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indicate his choice between these inconsistent 
remedies. 
Cook, supra, at 199, 
Plaintiff elected the remedy of specific performance 
by pursuing that claim at the trial and, therefore, the remedy 
of damages is barred. Plaintiff is not entitled to another 
trial on the issue of damages. 
Additionally, at trial Plaintiff did make a damage 
claim based on expert opinion. Plaintiff presented expert 
testimony as to the reasonable rental value of Plaintiff's 
property and relied on the Sprouse Lease on the Nine Mile 
property as evidence of damages for breach of contract (see 
Testimony of Steven Hatch, real estate appraiser, Tr. 
138-146). The court correctly rejected this evidence since it 
was incompetent evidence of the difference in the value of 
Plaintiff's and Defendants' property. 
The law refuses to tolerate a multiplicity of or 
needless litigation. This is based on the worthy premise that 
the interest of the proper administration of justice is best 
served by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or 
cause. 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments §395 (1969). 
A judgment is conclusive not only as to matters 
actually determined at trial, but also to other matters which 
could properly have been raised and determined therein. 46 
Am Jur 2d Judgments §420 (1969). 
It should also be noted that the Court did not limit 
Plaintiff in the presentation of his case so that he cannot now 
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claim that there was no reasonable opportunity to present 
evidence on the damage issue as he now, in the alternative, 
seeks to do. Plaintiff not only had the opportunity to but did 
put on evidence of damage. Therefore, in the interest of 
preventing multiplicity of suits, Plaintiff is barred from 
relitigating that issue. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS OF THE PARTIES 
AND THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO 
PURCHASE IS NOT LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE SINCE 
IT FAILS FOR LACK OF DEFINITENESS 
In order to have a binding contract, the minds of the 
parties must have arrived at a sufficient definite under-
standing as to the terms so that the parties know what they are 
bound to do and what they are to receive. Efco Distributing v. 
Perin, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615, 161 (1966). A 
binding contract can exist only where there has been mutual 
assent by the parties manifesting their intenion to be bound by 
its terms. Furthermore, a contract can be enforced by the 
courts only if the obligations of the parties are set forth 
with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed. Bunnell 
v. Bulls, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (1962). 
Additionally, a writing must contain all the essential 
terms in a contract for the sale of land in order to satisfy 
the requirements of the statute of frauds. The memorandum 
required by the statute of frauds presupposes a prior valid 
agreement and the meeting of the minds of the parties. 72 
Am Jur 2d Statute of Frauds §290 (1974). The memorandum must 
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show a completed contract, and if the parties have left an 
essential part of the agreement for future determination, it 
shows merely an incomplete contract. Id. 
In the case of a contract to sell land, the memorandum 
must describe the land sold. 72 Am Jur 2d Statute of Frauds 
§322 (1974). The property must be described or designated with 
reasonable certainty. The test is whether the writing furnishes 
the means of identification. 72 Am Jur 2d Statute of Frauds 
§323 (1974). 
The writing must contain something to designate 
or describe a particular piece of land. In view of 
that requirement, it is plain that if the premises 
bargained for are a part of a larger tract owned by 
the vendor, the question whether or not the writing 
satisfies the statute as to description will depend 
upon whether within itself or by references made it 
does or it does not in practical effect describe or 
designate the part covered by the contract. 
Additionally, a court cannot grant a decree of 
specific performance "unless all terms of the agreement are 
clear. The court cannot compel the performance of a contract 
which the parties did not mutually agree upon." Pitcher v. 
Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491, 493 (1967). 
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness, 
and ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture or 
to be supplied by the court. It must be sufficiently 
certain and definite in its terms to leave no 
reasonable doubt as to what the parties intended, and 
no reasonable doubt of the specific thing equity is 
called upon to have performed, and it must be 
sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the court 
may enforce it as actually made by the parties. 
Id. 
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In addition, if an insufficient description is given 
in a contract to sell land, oral evidence is not admissible 
because a court will never receive such evidence both to 
describe the land and then to apply the description. 72 Am Jur 
2d §322 (1974). 
Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not to 
supply, a description of lands in a contract. Parol 
evidence will not be admitted to complete a defective 
description, or to show the intention with which it 
was made. Parol evidence may be used for the purpose 
of identifying the description contained in the 
writing with its location upon the ground, but not for 
the purpose of ascertaining and locating the land 
about which the parties negotiated, and supplying a 
description thereof which they have omitted from the 
writing. There is a clear distinction between the 
admission of oral and extrinsic evidence for the 
purpose of identifying the land described and applying 
the description to the property and that of supplying 
and adding to a description insufficient and void on 
its fact. 
Davis v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1973). 
In Pitcher, supra, the parties entered into an earnest 
money receipt and offer to purchase which provided: 
The total purchase price of $100,000.00 shall be 
payable as follows: $100.00 which represents the 
aforedescribed deposit, receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged by you: on delivery of deed or final 
contract of sale which shall be on or before May 1, 
1962, and balance of purchase price to be paid as 
follows: 30 acres in North Logan as indicated by map 
valued at $50,000.00, $25,000.00 from loan on seller's 
farm and seller to carry balance on contract or second 
mortgage at 5% interest. (Emphasis added) 
The defendant owned a total of 189 acres of land in 
North Logan. The court held that the earnest money receipt and 
offer to purchase was not enforceable since it lacked 
certainty. "[I]t was not certain which 30 acres of the 189 
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acres owned by the defendant were to be conveyed to plaintff." 
J[d. at 493. 
In Davis, supra, the plaintiff brought suit to 
specifically enforce a real estate contract wherein the seller 
was to convey some property "less any acreage reserved by 
seller." The court found that since the seller could reserve 
any portion of the property as he so determined it was 
impossible to define the exact portion of the acreage which 
would be sold to the buyer; therefore, the description was not 
sufficient to permit specific performance. The court stated: 
In the instant action, the agreement in clear and 
unambiguous terms provided that the location and 
description of the land to be conveyed was subject to 
the future mutual agreement of the parties. This 
writing constituted a mere expression of a purpose to 
make a contract in the future, for the whole matter 
was contingent on further negotiations. 
JEd. at 1028. 
In the present case, Mr. Roger Olson, the real estate 
agent handling the transaction, discussed with Howard and Larry 
Francis before they signed the earnest money receipt that the 
document was only a work sheet and not a binding agreement. 
(Tr. 313, 319, 328, testimony of Howard Francis; Tr. 373, 
testimony of Larry Francis) Additionally, Mr. Olson told 
Deanne Tanner Francis, Howard Francis1 wife, and Anne Francis, 
Larry Francis1 wife, that the earnest money was not a binding 
agreement and was just a preliminary paper. (Tr. 298, 
testimony of Deanne Francis; Tr. 350, testimony of Anne 
Francis) Based on their understanding that they were not bound 
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by the earnest money receipt, Howard and Larry Francis finally 
signed the document on April 21, 1980 without having seen the 
Barker ranch. (Tr. 34, testimony of Howard Francis) The first 
time Howard Francis saw the farm was the Saturday following 
April 21, 1980. (Tr. 34, testimony of Howard Francis) At 
trial Roger Olson admitted that he told Howard and Larry that 
there were other things that would have to be agreed upon 
before the final agreement. (Tr. 98, testimony of Roger 
Olson) Howard and Larry would not have signed the earnest 
money agreement if they had understood that it was a binding 
agreement. (Tr. 323, testimony of Howard Francis) Howard and 
Larry did not understand the earnest money agreement to be a 
final binding agreement. 
Howard and Larry had not seen Mr. Barker's farm before 
they signed the agreement. They had not made an inquiry as to 
the value of the water stock. Everything Howard and Larry knew 
about the property came from Roger Olson who had received the 
information from Mr. Barker. (Tr. 30, testimony of Howard 
Francis) 
Deanne Francis and Anne Francis, the wives 
respectively of Howard Francis and Larry Francis and joint 
owners of the Nine Mile Ranch, had not been consulted regarding 
the transaction. They had not agreed to the sale. (Tr. 308, 
testimony of Deanne Francis; Tr. 351, testimony of Anne Francis) 
The earnest money agreement does not contain the 
description of either the Nine Mile Ranch or the Barker farm 
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property* Mr. Barker agreed to convey 80 acres of property 
near Wellington (Ex. 1). However, he owned a total of 150 
acres all together. (Tr. 152, 170, testimony of Robert 
Barker) Roger Olson was never given a legal description of the 
80 acres. (Tr. 90, testimony of Roger Olson) Mr. Barker has 
never given the Francises a legal description of the 80 acres. 
(Tr. 194, 199, testimony of Robert Barker) 
The parties had not discussed or agreed upon which of 
the 40 acres of the summer range would be retained by the 
Francises. (Tr. 93, 95, 99, testimony of Roger Olson; Tr. 192, 
testimony of Robert Barker) Furthermore, there was no 
discussion or agreement where the right-of-way to the 40 acres 
would be located and the width of the right-of-way. (J^ d) 
At the time of the transaction, Mr. Barker did not own 
the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the farm property. (Tr. 
191, testimony of Robert Barker; Tr. 271, testimony of Dan 
Keller) The Barker farm was subject to two different mineral 
leases. (Tr. 236, testimony of Therald Jensen; Tr. 272, 
testimony of Dan Keller) Mr. Barker never did seek to get the 
mineral lease removed. (Tr. 214, testimony of Robert Barker) 
It was never agreed whether the Francises would take the farm 
property subject to the leases. 
It was never decided whether there were water rights 
that went with the 80 acres of land independent of the shares 
of the Scofield water. (Tr. 325, testimony of Howard Francis) 
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The Francises1 property was subject to an underlying 
contract. (Tr. 262, testimony of Dan Keller) The parties had 
not agreed who would pay off the contract on the property. 
(Tr. 110, testimony of Roger Olson) 
After signing the earnest money agreement, the parties 
continued to negotiate various items regarding the agreement. 
There were discussions regarding hunting privileges on the Nine 
Mile Ranch. (Ex. 42; Tr. 250, testimony of Therald Jensen) 
There were also discussions regarding a lease on the farm 
property. (Id.) 
In summary, as Howard Francis testified, there were 
many things yet to be done and a need for further negotiations 
before a final agreement could be made: 
There were several things that I understood would have 
to be done. Number one, I understood that our wives 
would have to be aware of this document and would have 
to give their consent and agreement and would have to 
sign a document in order for it to be binding. I felt 
that we had progressed far enough in our negotiations 
to the point that we now had something with which to 
discuss in person with Mr. Barker; and at this point I 
now suggested to Mr. Olson that we go down to 
Wellington and meet Mr. Barker, that we see what the 
farm as had been represented to me, was, where it was, 
what it consisted of, what it looked like, and so on, 
whether it had ditches, what type they were, whether 
it had water appurtenant to it, how it was irrigated, 
what went with it, and so on. I also felt that at 
this point we should now investigate and determine 
whether the water shares were as represented by Mr. 
Barker through his agent, Mr. Olson. I also knew that 
we had to determine where the 40 acres would be on the 
summer range of our property that we would be 
retaining and communicate that information to the 
Barkers. I knew that we would have to delineate and 
define the right-of-way to help us get to that 40 
acres. That hadn't been determined. I didn't have 
any knowledge about the mineral rights on Mr. Barker's 
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80 acres, what they were, whether they had any value 
or not. 
(Tr. 324, testimony of Howard Francis) 
The Francises were told by the real estate agent 
handling the transaction that the Earnest Money was not a 
binding agreement. On that basis, they signed the agreement 
without seeing the property and investigating the value of the 
water shares, and with the understanding it was only 
preliminary and not final and was subject to further 
negotiation. Also, they did not involve their wives in the 
negotiations as they normally would do. Therefore, the wives 
who were joint owners of the ranch had never agreed to the 
property exchange. There remained many items still to be 
determined by the parties. The parties had not arrived at a 
sufficient definite understanding as to the terms of the 
agreement. The earnest money agreement is void for lack of 
definiteness, and it is unenforceable since it does not comply 
with the requrements of the statute of frauds. 
POINT V 
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE 
IS VOID SINCE THE PARTIES DID NOT TIMELY 
CLOSE THE TRANSACTION 
One condition to the acceptance of the Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase was a stipulation that the 
closing date would be May 1, 1980 (Exhibit 1). The parties did 
not close nor did the Plaintiff offer tender of performance 
before that date. 
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A tender of performance should be seasonable, and 
should be made at the time fixed by the contract for 
performance. 17A C.J.S. Contracts §482 (1963). While time may 
be made of the essence of the contract by express stipulation, 
this result may occur from implication as well as express 
provision. Time of the essence of the contract may appear 
either from the language of the contract, clearly indicating, 
although not expressly stating, such intention, or from the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction such as the relation 
of the parties. 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser §104 (1955). 
Ordinarily, therefore, the question is one of intention and to 
be ascertained from the construction of the contract as a whole 
and with reference to the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff first scheduled 
April 1, 1980 as the closing date in his initial offer to 
purchase. The Defendants extended the closing date to May 1, 
1980 as the condition for the acceptance of the offer. The 
transaction included the transfer of both a ranch and a farm. 
It was apparently essential for Plaintiff to receive the 
property he was to get and in turn both parties would need to 
know who was going to be operating the farm early in order that 
planting and other spring activities could occur. The specific 
inclusion of the term in the contract shows that time was of 
the essence to the parties. Additionally, the Defendants 
conducted themselves as though the April 21 closing date was of 
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the essence. When the Francises received a letter dated May 
27, 1980 from Therald Jensen, Mr. Barker's attorney, in which 
Mr. Jensen proposed a closing date of June 10, 1980, the 
Francises refused on the basis that the closing time had 
already gone by and that there was no agreement. (Tr. 202, 
testimony of Robert L. Barker; Tr. 336, testimony of Howard 
Francis) 
Where time is of the essence, both parties are 
discharged from their contract obligations under an earnest 
money receipt if neither makes tender of performance by the 
agreed closing date. Century 21 All Western Real Estate and 
Investment, Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 55 n.l (Utah, 1982). In 
Guillory Corporation v. Dussin Investment Company, 272 Or. 267, 
536 P.2d 501, 505 (1975), the court stated: 
This is an action for damages, in which plaintiff 
must necessarily affirm the existence and enforce-
ability of the earnest money agreement as the basis 
for its claim for damages. The earnest money agree-
ment, by its express terms, was to expire on June 30, 
1971, the date provided for the closing of the 
transaction, with "time of the essence," unless on or 
before that date the seller tendered a contract to 
convey good title and the buyer tendered the down 
payment. On June 30th neither party performed and 
although neither refused to perform, neither party at 
that time either demanded performance by the other or 
claimed any excuse for its own failure to perform . . 
Under these facts, we hold that the earnest money 
agreement expires by its own terms on June 30, 1971. 
Even if time is not of the essence of performance 
under the earnest money agreement, performance must occur 
within a reasonable time. See, Duprey v. Donahoe, 52 Wash. 2d 
129, 323 P.2d 903 (1958); Bursack v. Moore, 165 Colo. 414, 439 
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P.2d 993 (1968); and Schull v. Sexton, 154 Colo. 311, 390 P.2d 
313 (1964). 91 C.J.C. Vendor1 & Purchaser §101 (1955) provides: 
If the contract of sale does not specify the time 
of performance, or the terms as to time are indefinite 
. . . a reasonable time for performance will 
ordinarily be implied. In other words a reasonable 
time for performance will be allowed, and performance 
within a reasonable time will be required. What is a 
reasonable time necessarily depends on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case. 
The rule requiring performance within a reasonable time applies 
both to the time for making and executing the conveyance by the 
vendor, and to the time for making a tendering payment by the 
purchaser. Id. 
In the instant case, both the specific time and a 
reasonable time for performance had passed. The Francises were 
not willing to close at a later date. Mr. Barker never 
tendered performance under the earnest money agreement. 
Therefore, the earnest money agreement is void since there was 
not a timely tender of performance by either party. 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT SUE FOR BREACH OF THE EARNEST 
MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE SINCE HE 
FAILED TO TENDER PERFORMANCE UNDER THE CONTRACT 
Where either party to a contract seeks to enforce it 
by suit, he must first put the other party in default by making 
and tendering performance under the contract. See, Huch v. 
Hayes, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah, 1977). In Century 21 All Western 
Real Estate and Investment, Inc. v. Webb, supra, the court 
stated: 
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During the executory period of a contract whose 
time of performance is uncertain but which contem-
plates ,simultaneous performance by both parties, such 
as the earnest money agreement involved in this case, 
neither party can be said to be in default (and thus 
susceptible to a judgment for damages or a decree for 
specific performance) until the other party has 
tendered his own performance . . . . In other words, 
the party who desires to use legal process to exercise 
his legal remedies under such a contract must make a 
tender of his own agreed performance in order to put 
the other party in default. 
Id. at 55-56. 
Furthermore, in a case of specific performance, the 
tender of performance by the plaintiff is required in order to 
fulfill the equitable clean-hands requirement. 
[I]t is also true that specific performance is remedy 
of equity; and one who invokes it must have clean 
hands in having done equity himself. That is, he must 
take care to discharge his own duties under the 
contract . . . [H]e must make an effort to perform, or 
to tender performance, which manifests reasonable 
diligence and a bona fide desire to keep his own 
promises. 
Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45, 46-47 (Utah 1974). 
In Fischer, supra, the plaintiff and defendant entered 
into an earnest money agreement in anticipation of entering 
into a contract for purchase of the defendant's restaurant. 
The earnest money agreement required plaintiff to pay $3,000 
when the seller approved the sale and that approval of and 
entry into the final contract must be done by March 19, 1973. 
On March 19, 1973, plaintiff delivered to an employee of 
defendant a notice stating that he was ready and willing to 
enter into and perform the purchase contract. However, the 
plaintiff did not tender the $3,000. The court held that the 
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notice was insufficient, and the plaintiff was required to 
tender the $3,000. The Utah Supreme Court therefore reversed 
the judgment for specific performance. 
In the instant case, Mr. Barker failed to tender the 
deed to the 80 acres and the water stock. In fact, it was 
impossible for Mr. Barker to do so since he did not own all the 
mineral rights on his farm and the property was subject to 
mineral leases. (Tr. 271, 272, testimony of Dan Keller) Mr. 
Barker did nothing to get the mineral leases removed. (Tr. 
214, testimony of Robert Barker) Therefore, Plaintiff is not 
entitled to enforcement of the earnest money agreement. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY AWARDED 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS FEES 
Since Plaintiff elected to sue in equity for specific 
performance, as argued above, he was precluded by the doctrine 
of election of remedies from bringing an action at law for 
damages. Therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to even a 
nominal damage award. Additionally, Plaintiff was not entitled 
to the attorneys fees award on the action at law for alleged 
breach of contract since the action at law was precluded by the 
election to pursue the equitable remedy. 
Furthermore, as argued above, the trial court 
erroneously found that Defendants Larry and Howard Francis had 
breached the earnest money agreement. The earnest money 
agreement is not enforceable because the contract is indefinite 
and there is no meeting of the minds of the parties. 
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Additionally, the earnest money agreement was not timely 
closed, and Plaintiff failed to tender performance under the 
contract. Since the earnest money agreement is not 
enforceable, Defendants are not liable for even nominal damages 
for breach of contract. In addition, Plaintiff is not entitled 
to attorneys fees on the nominal damage award given for breach 
of contract. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff's affidavit in support of 
attorneys fees is insufficient in that it does not detail when 
the alleged services were performed, the nature of the services 
rendered, and the reasonable value thereof, or the basis for 
the hourly rate charge. Since the evidence of attorneys fees 
is insufficient, the attorneys fee award was erroneous. 
Additionally, there is no way to distinguish the work done on 
the specific performance aspect of the case and the damage 
aspect of the case (a copy of the affidavit in support of 
attorneys fees is included in the Addendum). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff does not seek partial specific performance, 
but is attempting to have this Court make a new agreement for 
the parties and then enforce it. Additionally, Plaintiff is 
not entitled to specific performance because of the inequitable 
conduct of Plaintiff and his agent. The earnest money 
agreement is not enforceable since it is indefinite and there 
was no meeting of minds by the parties. Additionally, the 
earnest money agreement was not timely closed and Plaintiff 
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failed to tender performance under the agreement. Plaintiff is 
not entitled to attorneys fees since he elected to sue for 
specific performance and the contract is not enforceable and 
therefore there are no grounds for a finding of breach of 
contract. Defendants ask this court to uphold the judgment of 
the trial court, denying specific performance of the earnest 
money agreement to Plaintiff. Additionally, Defendants ask 
that the judgment of attorneys fees and costs awarded to 
Plaintiff be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this » S day of February, 
1986. 
<Ui-c^4x3 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Richard K. Hincks 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid thereon, to 
Jackson Howard and Danielle Eyer Davis, HOWARD, LEWIS & 
PETERSEN, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, 120 East 300 
North, P. 0. Box 778, Provo, Utah 84603, this day of 
February, 1986. 
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FRED D. HOWARD, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 EMt 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 Our File No. 14,342 
Provo, Utah 84608 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. BARKER, : 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
vs. 
DR. HOWARD R. FRANCIS, Civil No. 13,901 
DEANNE TANNER FRANCIS, : 
DR. LARRY FRANCIS and 
ANN BANKS FRANCIS, : 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
* ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Fred D. Howard, upon my oath, do hereby state: 
I have examined the accounting records and ledgers of this law office, which 
has represented the plaintiffs in the above-entitled action, and I have been a 
primary attorney involved and responsible for prosecution of the plaintiff's case. 
Attorney's fees have been accumulated in this case by the labors and services of 
various attorneys and clerks associated with the law firm of Howard, Lewis & 
Petersen since initiation of the lawsuit. Charges have varied from time to time 
with general rate increases over past years and have accumulated with the following 
Jackson Howard 
Jackson Howard 
Fred D. Howard 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
Danielle Davis 
John L. Valentine 
Clerks 
$100.00 
$150.00 
$ 50.00 
$ 30.00 
$ 50.00 
$ 45.00 
$ 75.00 
$ 20.00 
individuals, time and rates: 
NAME HOURLY RATE HRS. TOTAL 
6.00 $ 600.00 
69.00 $10,350.00 
83.75 $ 4,187.00 
1.75 $ 52.50 
7.00 $ 350.00 
12.50 $ 562.50 
.25 $ 18.75 
94.15 $ 1,883.00 
$18,004.25 
The hourly rates accrued herein are typical as of market rates for legal 
services at the particular time and have been reasonable in nature, if not conserva-
tive. The award of the sum of $18,004.25 for attorney fees is, therefore, a 
reasonable, proper and accurate attorney fees. 
In addition to the preceding, plaintiffs have accrued costs relative to 
prosecution of the suit in the sum of $1,901.04, all of which costs have been 
necessary and related to the regular prosecution of plaintiff's claims. An itemiza-
tion of said costs is attached herewith and labeled and Exhibit "A". 
DATED this J ^ ^ t l a v of March, 1985. 
^ S W 
:RED D. HOWARD, for: 
HOWARD, L£WIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this «ctf day of March, 1985. 
NOTARY PUBLIQ 
My Commission Expires: Residing at 
^-yvu^iM^. k&J 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Affidavit for Attorney's Fees, postage 
prepaid, thisC7j_ day of March, 1985 to: 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Richard M Taylor 
TAYLOR & TAYLOR 
275 North Main Street 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
SECRETARY 
'•TfO- Zrfp>~ 
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